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Over the past 30 years, Turkey has been governed by 22 governments, while high and 
persistent inflation became a major feature of the Turkish economy. Several disinflation 
attempts since late 1970s seem to have failed one after another. The Turkish economy never 
experienced hyperinflation like Argentine or Israel in the period of global inflation from 1973 
to 1994 but she felt into a unique situation after 1994. In 2002, the Turkish annual inflation 
rate was still 13 times higher than the average rate of inflation in the world, while global 
inflation rate has dropped from 25.3 percent in 1994 to 3.2 percent in 2002. Figure 1 is 
devoted to demonstrate various dimensions and the length of this unhappy experience of 
Turkey within the past 30 years.  
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(a)  Annual Inflation Rates in Turkey 
































































































































(c)  Annual Percent Changes in National Consumer Price Indices 







































































































































































































































































(b)  Year-to-Year Changes in Consumer Price Index and Timing of Government 
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(d)  Relative Inflation: Ratio of Annual Consumer Price Inflation in Turkey to Foreign 
Inflation Rate (1969–2002) 
Source: State Institute of Statistics, State Planning Organization, and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM version, February 2004); author’s own calculations.  
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As end of March 2004, however, the existing single-party government seems to have 
succeeded to lower inflation to single-digit levels, at least in terms of the wholesale price 
increases. However, many observers and experts of the Turkish economy think that it is still 
too early to believe that Turkey hereafter is a low inflation country because there still exists a 
number of potential causes, which may trigger the inflationary process in the country again. 
In Turkey, it is commonly argued that sustainability of high and persistent inflation since 
the early 1970s has been “fed” by: 
(1)  high public sector budget deficits, 
(2)  monetization of public sector budget deficits, 
(3)  massive infrastructure investments of the various governments, such as for the 
Southeastern Anatolian Project, 
(4)  high military expenditures associated with geopolitical reasons, 
(5) political instability which results in inflationary pressures due to populist policies that 
have ensued prior to each general election, 
(6)  persistent inflationary expectations of economic agents, 
(7) inflationary effects of changes in exchange rates via increases in prices of imported 
inputs, 
(8)  occasional increases in world prices of major imported inputs (particularly, crude-oil), 
(9)  increases in regulated prices of public sector products which are mainly used as input by 
the domestic private sector, and/or 
(10) rising interest rates resulting from the crowding-out effect of public sector borrowing in 
a shallow domestic capital market.   
4 
In reality, however, most of these “possible” causes discussed publicly may be condensed 
into a smaller number of determinants in order to better understand the dynamics of inflation 
in Turkey in the past, as well as the latest disinflation process after 1999. Actually, there are 
many reasons to do so. First of all, some of the factors listed above are closely interrelated, or 
may be seen as stemming from the same macroeconomic category. Second of all, some other 
factors mentioned above cannot be accepted as real causes of inflation if we consider the 
relevant debates in the theory of macroeconomics or if we check the results of related 
empirical studies. Furthermore, to be able to understand the underlying causes of the success 
in the current disinflation process, one should rank these broader factors according to their 
relative importance with respect to their roles from late 1999 to early 2004. 
In this paper, I mainly attempt selectively to review both the major macroeconomic 
developments and existing large body of empirical literature on Turkish inflation and 
disinflation. Section 2 presents a theoretical categorization of causes of inflation. Section 3 
presents a short review of macroeconomic developments, which highlighted the high 
inflationary decades in the past in Turkey. After that, I compare selected empirical studies of 
Turkish inflation in terms of their main results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to 
summarizing the main conclusions of the review. 
2.  Conceptual and Theoretical Background 
Inflation is usually defined as sustained increases in the general price level for goods and 
services in an economy. This definition excludes clearly one-time increases in the price level. 
For many economists today, an adequate approach to explain the process of high and long-
lasting increases in the general price level of goods and services requires a concentration on 
sources of core, or underlying, inflation, and not on changes in relative prices caused by 
factors, such as one-time increases in administered prices or unfavorable weather conditions.  
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If equilibrium price level in a domestic market for goods and services rises continuously as 
a result of continued excess demand conditions in successive time periods, then economists 
speak in general from demand-pull inflation. In this case aggregate demand grows faster than 
the level of aggregate supply and “pulls” prices higher. But if firms’ costs increase 
continuously as in the cases of rising wages, interest rates, taxes, imported input prices, or 
exchange rates, then some economists prefer to use the term cost-push inflation to describe 
this phenomenon. 
In practice, however, it is not always easy to decompose the observed inflation into its 
demand-pull and cost-push components. The process is dynamic, and the shocks to prices are 
mixed. Furthermore, inflation itself, or inertia in inflation, may also cause future inflation. 
Finally, some theories include both demand-side and supply-side channels of feedback in 
explaining inflation. Therefore, we need other criteria, besides demand-pull and cost-push, to 
classify theories of inflation. There are many alternative possibilities to distinguish various 
types of inflation theories. For example, we may differentiate between short-run vs. long-run 
inflation theories, closed vs. open economy models of inflation, theories of low-, high- or 
hyper-inflation, perfect competition (market-clearing) vs. imperfect (monopolistic) 
competition models, theories with assumptions of perfect or imperfect information, fiscal vs. 
monetary theories of inflation, etc. Following Kibritçioğlu (2002),
1 I prefer to employ the 
following four-blocked theoretical categorization of the causes of inflation. 
The economy-wide price-level is the relative price of goods and services in terms of 
money, as implied in the definition of inflation in the first sentence of this section. Therefore, 
__________________________________ 
1  For surveys of inflation theories, interested readers may see Whitney (1982: 59-87), Frisch (1983), McCallum 
(1987), Beckerman (1992: 27-49) and Siklos (ed.) (1995: 3-34). Note that Humphrey (1998) specifically 
surveys the historical origins of cost-push inflation theories.   
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inflation must be a phenomenon that results from the interaction of monetary (demand-side) 
and real (supply-side) factors.
2 
The primary source of shocks in the demand-side is seen commonly as sustained public 
sector deficits. Modeling the role of government deficits and their financing methods is one of 
the major challenges faced by economists. The modification of an inflation model to allow for 
feedbacks, or “eroding” effects, from the inflation to the real value of government revenues 
due to the existence of tax-collection lags (Olivera-Tanzi effect),
3 and/or to the real value of 
the government’s liabilities (inflation tax), leads to an increase in the complexity of the 
structure of the proposed model.  
The study of inflationary effects stemming from real shocks is closely related to the 
economics of technology, long-run growth theory, and theory of exchange-rate determination, 
since they arise in the form of, e.g., negative productivity shocks, stagflationary relative-price 
shocks related to imported raw materials, or depreciations in the domestic currency. But, this 
is not the whole story. The time path of prices may also be influenced by the expectations, 
stickiness of prices/wages, and possible indexation experiences in the economy. Therefore, 
these inertial factors should be considered as a third block of explanatory factors of inflation. 
The last block of explanatory factors of inflation seems to be offered by the new political 
macroeconomics. To model the dynamics of inflation more realistically, the political process, 
or the role of institutions and incentives, must also be considered explicitly. Most of the 
theoretical discussions on causes of inflation above are based on the assumption that financial 
markets are highly developed and functioning very well in the presence of necessary laws and 
__________________________________ 
2  Traditionally, macroeconom(etr)ic models posit that monetary shocks have an effect on the economy only 
through a demand channel of transmission. In recent years, however, some economists argued that monetary 
shocks may also create important supply-side, or cost-side, effects on output and prices. For various 
theoretical models of monetary transmission mechanisms which allow monetary policy shocks to have both 
supply-side and demand-side effects, see Barth and Ramey (2001) and references cited therein. 
3  See Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977, 1978).  
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rules. However, this is not the case in many high-inflation developing countries. Thus, the 
political or institutional approach to macroeconomics suggests that one should take into 
account the institutional, political and cultural changes in such economies, and modify the 
model to explain high-inflation accordingly. As a conclusion, the complex and dynamic 
interactions of four groups of factors (i.e., demand shocks, supply shocks, inertial factors and 
the political process) come together to explain inflation in any economy. 
3. Macroeconomic  Background 
4 
Until the end of the 1970s, successive Turkish governments pursued an inward-oriented, or 
import-substituting, industrialization strategy. Oil-price shocks in the 1970s and related 
balance-of-payments problems contributed substantially to a deep economic recession and a 
political and social crisis in Turkey. On the institutional and policy side, Turkey embarked on 
far reaching structural reforms after 1979. In early 1980, in response to a strong balance-of-
payments crisis accompanied by a deep recession and accelerated inflation, Turkey 
abandoned its inward-oriented development strategy and gradually started to introduce free-
market based reforms. After the introduction of a broad stabilization and liberalization 
program in January 1980, the government installed by the military regime in September 1980 
was able to lower year-to-year increases in consumer prices from 140 percent in May 1980 to 
33 percent and accelerate economic growth in the following four years. However, after 1983, 
the volatility of annual real GDP growth rates increased substantially and price increases 
speeded up again (see Table 1). 
__________________________________ 
4  Interested readers may see Ertuğrul and Selçuk (2002), Selçuk (2004), Selçuk and Ardıç (2004a) and 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2003) up-to-date Country Report for further information about the 
macroeconomic and political developments in Turkey.  
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1970    6.9     3.2     26.4     220.4     176  -   0.7     0.0     21.9 
1971    15.7     5.6     31.1     259.7     322     21.8     0.0     28.1 
1972    11.7     7.4  -   5.5     208.3     564     5.8     0.0     26.0 
1973    15.4     3.3  -   0.1     173.9     716     39.9     0.0     28.4 
1974    15.8     5.6  -   1.6     131.9  -   433     159.0     0.0     25.7 
1975    19.2     7.2     3.8     123.1  -   561     21.4     0.0     28.0 
1976    17.4     10.5     10.9     118.2     57     8.2     0.0     23.4 
1977    27.1     3.4     12.3     107.4  -   331     12.5     0.0     33.8 
1978    45.3     1.5     35.0     96.2     163  -   1.0     0.0     36.5 
1979    58.7  -   0.6     27.9     74.9  -   143     37.8     0.0     61.7 
1980    110.2  -   2.4     144.3     87.7     419     110.5     0.0     74.5 
1981    36.6     4.9     46.8     93.1  -   149  -   0.2     0.0     85.0 
1982    30.8     3.6     45.9     104.1     151  -   9.7     0.0     56.7 
1983    31.4     5.0     39.2     110.0     174  -   9.7     0.0     29.8 
1984    48.4     6.7     61.9     122.4  -   14  -   5.5     5.1     58.0 
1985    45.0     4.2     42.6     122.9  -   219  -   1.2     9.0     55.5 
1986    34.6     7.0     29.3     119.7     348  -   49.5     22.3     42.5 
1987    38.8     9.5     27.2     119.3     351     27.5     31.5     45.0 
1988    73.7     2.1     66.4     115.4     589  -   18.4     34.6     54.1 
1989    63.3     0.3     48.6     105.3    2 524     17.9     29.5     73.3 
1990    60.3     9.3     22.9     100.0    1 141     33.1     30.4     51.8 
1991    66.0     0.9     60.2     102.8  -  1 054  -   20.6     44.4     63.6 
1992    70.1     6.0     64.6     112.2    1 198  -   1.6     55.6     62.9 
1993    66.1     8.0     60.5     107.7     97  -   14.8     69.9     48.1 
1994    106.3  -   5.5     169.9     137.1     899  -   2.1     94.9     123.2 
1995    88.1     7.2     53.7     131.7    5 279     7.6     99.7     99.4 
1996    80.3     7.0     78.0     134.2    3 882     21.4     89.8     132.8 
1997    85.7     7.5     86.8     127.2    2 146  -   8.8     97.1     93.5 
1998    84.6     3.1     71.6     127.6    1 302  -   35.3     83.8     101.9 
1999    64.9  -   4.7     61.0     128.6    3 456     41.6     82.2     96.1 
2000    54.9     7.4     48.5     113.9  -  1 005     58.7     79.4     42.5 
2001    54.4  -   7.5     96.5     128.9  -  3 385  -   15.7     127.9     48.0 
2002    45.0     7.9     22.9     112.8    8 020     2.8     120.7     31.0 
2003*    25.3     5.8  -   0.8     113.5    6 809     14.8     86.4     33.7 
1970-1979    23.3     4.7     14.0     151.4     53     30.5     0.0     31.4 
1980    110.2  -   2.4     144.3     87.7     419     110.5     0.0     74.5 
 1981-1988    42.4     5.4     44.9     113.4     154  -   8.3     12.8     53.3 
 1989-1993    65.1     4.9     51.4     105.6     781     2.8     46.0     59.9 
 1994    106.3  -   5.5     169.9     137.1     899  -   2.1     94.9     123.2 
 1995-1999    80.7     4.0     70.2     129.9    3 213     5.3     90.5     104.7 
 2000-2001    54.7  -   0.1     72.5     121.4  -  2 195     21.5     103.6     45.2 
 2002-2003    35.1     6.9     11.0     113.1    7 414     8.8     103.5     32.3 
 1970-2003    49.9     4.1     46.7     126.2     985     13.2     38.1     56.4 
 
Source:  State Institute of Statistics, State Planning Organization, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, JP Morgan, and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM version, February 2004); author’s own calculations. 
* Provisory or estimated figures.  
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1970 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -   171  n.a.  n.a. 
1971 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -   109  n.a.  n.a. 
1972 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -   8  n.a.  n.a. 
1973 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     484  n.a.  n.a. 
1974 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -   561  n.a.  n.a. 
1975    4.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  1 648     40  n.a. 
1976    6.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  2 029     73  n.a. 
1977    8.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  3 140     968  n.a. 
1978    3.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  1 265     402  n.a. 
1979    7.3  n.a.     56.9  n.a.  -  1 413  -  1 000  n.a. 
1980    8.9     8.3     55.2  n.a.  -  3 408  -   2     35 
1981    4.0     7.3     56.7  n.a.  -  1 936     121     95 
1982    3.6     7.2     59.4  n.a.  -   952     98     55 
1983    5.0     7.9     60.3  n.a.  -  1 923     798     46 
1984    5.4     7.8     74.3  n.a.  -  1 439  -   652     113 
1985    3.6     7.3     70.3  n.a.  -  1 013    1 479     99 
1986    3.7     8.1     70.0     1.0  -  1 465     812     125 
1987    6.1     8.5     77.1     4.0  -   806     50     115 
1988    4.8     8.7     74.8     2.3    1 596  -  2 281     354 
1989    5.4     8.7     72.8     2.6     938  -   584     663 
1990    7.5     8.2     75.2     8.9  -  2 625    3 000     684 
1991    10.2     7.8     74.0     5.3     250  -  3 020     810 
1992    10.7     8.0     76.4     3.4  -   974    1 396     844 
1993    12.1     7.7     79.6     5.6  -  6 433    2 994     636 
1994    7.9     8.1     72.9     4.2    2 631  -  5 190     608 
1995    5.0     6.9     78.6     5.3  -  2 338    3 635     885 
1996    8.8     6.0     78.0     5.0  -  2 437    2 665     722 
1997    7.9     6.4     79.4     7.8  -  2 638  -   7     805 
1998    9.7     6.8     76.5     7.3    1 984    1 313     940 
1999    15.8     7.6     72.4     8.0  -  1 344    1 024     783 
2000    12.6     6.6     75.9     13.2  -  9 819    4 200     982 
2001    16.2     8.4     70.9     5.1    3 390  -  11 321    3 266 
2002    12.6     10.4     75.4     4.2  -  1 522  -  1 279     585 
2003*    8.6     10.6     78.4     4.9  -  6 808    4 269     294 
1970-1979    6.1  n.a.     56.9  n.a.  -   986     97  n.a. 
1980    8.9     8.3     55.2  n.a.  -  3 408  -   2     35 
 1981-1988    4.5     7.9     67.8     2.4  -   992     53     125 
 1989-1993    9.2     8.1     75.6     5.2  -  1 769     757     727 
 1994    7.9     8.1     72.9     4.2    2 631  -  5 190     608 
 1995-1999    9.4     6.8     77.0     6.7  -  1 355    1 726     827 
 2000-2001    14.4     7.5     73.4     9.2  -  3 215  -  3 561    2 124 
 2002-2003    10.6     10.5     76.9     4.6  -  4 165    1 495     440 
 1970-2003    7.8     7.9     71.6     5.5  -  1 440     138     606 
 
Source:  State Institute of Statistics, State Planning Organization, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, JP Morgan, and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM version, February 2004); author’s own calculations. 
* Provisory or estimated figures.  
n.a.: not available.  
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The 1980 stabilization and liberalization program was designed to devalue the Turkish lira to 
eliminate its excess overvaluation, to increase the prices of public sector products and to 
remove restrictions on interest rates. Over the first four years of the program, the first steps of 
external liberalization concentrated on current account transactions. In May 1981, the 
government took the first step from fixed to a managed floating exchange-rate system. In 
1984, domestic citizens were allowed to open foreign exchange deposit accounts in Turkish 
banks (see Table 1). In 1989, the government finally took serious steps to liberalize the capital 
account, too. Following the introduction of convertibility, the overvaluation of the Turkish 
lira and high domestic interest rates on government bonds attracted short-term capital inflows 
to the country. The change in the deficit financing method of the public sector from money to 
bond-finance starting in 1986, and attempts to stabilize the exchange rate to prevent the 
inflationary effects of rising exchange rates made this policy combination unsustainable 
within a short period of time. It led to an “exchange-rate” crisis in the first half of 1994 
without a “balance-of-payments” crisis typical of the 1970s. In 1994, the annual inflation rate 
exceeded 100 percent as in 1980. 
Turkish governments introduced new disinflation measures to stabilize the economy after 
the 1994 financial crisis. However, these efforts in 1995, 1998 and 2000 failed to reduce the 
inflation rate to levels below 25 percent per year, as it had been in the early 1970s. The 1998 
disinflation program did not last very long, because the Russian crisis in 1998, the domestic 
general elections in April 1999 and the devastating earthquake in August 1999 led to a 
deterioration of the fiscal balance of the public sector. The so-called three-year program, 
which was introduced in December 1999, was essentially an exchange-rate-based stabilization 
program supplemented by fiscal adjustment and structural reforms. There were also measures 
to strengthen and regulate the banking sector. The main objective of the 2000–02 program 
was to reduce inflation to single-digit levels in medium term. With this program it was also  
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aimed to diminish public sector deficit with special emphasis on fiscal discipline, to foster 
growth and to settle a market-oriented economy via various structural adjustment policies. To 
achieve these targets tight monetary and fiscal policy and comprehensive structural reforms 
were adopted as main policy measures. 
The main tool of the 2000–02 disinflation program was actually the adoption of a 
crawling-peg regime: The percent change in the Turkish lira value of a basket of foreign 
exchanges was fixed for a period of a year and a half. At the beginning, the program was quite 
successful. Interest rates fell sharply below expected levels, inflation significantly slowed 
down, and production and domestic demand started to increase. Despite the fact that the 
program achieved some remarkable results in a short period of time, the 2000–02 program 
had to be revised in light of the two successive liquidity and exchange-rate crises; first in 
November 2000, as a result of the extremely risky position of a medium-sized bank with large 
holdings of government securities in its portfolio, and then in February 2001. The government 
abandoned the crawling-peg regime under the original plan and floated the Turkish lira in 
February 2001. The policies of the Central Bank since then have been aimed at controlling the 
volatility of the exchange rate rather than targeting its level or direction while trying to lower 
the inflation rate. Although factors, such as real appreciation of the Turkish lira, also may 
have played a role in developments pushing the economy into crises in late 2000 and early 
2001, the main reasons for these crises were unsustainable domestic debt of the public sector 
and unhealthy structure of the Turkish financial sector. 
To overcome the negative impact of the crises and to achieve sustainable economic 
growth, a new strengthened economic program has been launched on May 2001. In February 
2002, a revised three-year plan for the 2002–04 period was adopted. The new plan contained 
provisions for fiscal adjustment to help bring about debt sustainability, reform of the banking 
sector through an operational and financial restructuring of public banks, and regulation and   
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supervision of private banks. However, the early general elections on November 3, 2002 
dramatically changed the political climate in Turkey. The established single-party government 
contacted the International Monetary Fund to make minor changes in the program to disinflate 
and restructure the Turkish economy. The current economic program, which is in 
implementation since early 2002, has two overriding goals: To manage the crises and increase 
the resilience of the economy to shocks and to ensure growth with disinflation. In order to 
achieve these targets, strong structural adjustment policies focusing on the elimination of 
problems in the banking sector, enhancement of transparency in economic management and 
improvement of governance in both public and private sector have been adopted. Fiscal and 
monetary policies have been shaped to ensure the sustainability of government’s fiscal 
position and to bring down the inflation permanently. Social policies have been strengthened 
to alleviate the effects of the crisis on the most vulnerable groups of the society. 
According to the current government, their program differs greatly from the previous 
programs implemented in 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the current program got started on a solid 
base that the other programs did not have. These were: (i) the amendments made in the 
Central Bank Law for the Central bank independence, (ii) the radical measures taken for a 
healthy banking system, (iii) the realization of basic structural reforms to a great extent by 
gaining momentum in 2001 and 2002, and (iv) the measures for the continuation of fiscal 
discipline. 
2004 is the last year of the three-year macroeconomic program. So far, the disinflation 
process functioned well (see Table 1). Fiscal discipline is increasing while interest rates are 
gradually falling. The Central Bank’s independency is respected by the government. Exports 
of goods and services are increasing, despite the fact that in 2003 the Turkish lira was 
overvalued against foreign currencies. Strong currency substitution arisen after 1983 is 
rapidly diminishing. Some experts argue that the overvaluation in 2003 may be caused both  
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by reverse currency substitution and by unrecorded foreign-exchange inflows from abroad. 
However, there are still things to be done by the government in order to achieve more healthy 
and sustainable macroeconomic conditions. The heavy unemployment problem, which is 
arisen after the 2000–01 financial crisis, is still a problem to be solved. Income distribution is 
negatively affected by chronic inflation. Another important issue is the restructuring of the 
banking system to increase efficiency in financial sector, to achieve a healthy financial sector, 
and to remove the problems in channeling funds to real sector. In 2002, privatization targets 
were not fully met, in part because of the early elections. Therefore, in 2003 and 2004, the 
privatization is still a top agenda item in the program. Turkey needs a renewed privatization 
effort, measures and legislative changes to attract foreign direct investment, fighting 
corruption and improving corporate governance. To sum up, all economic agents in Turkey 
should learn how to act in a low-inflation environment now. Without a permanent change in 
their economic, political and cultural mentality, nobody can be sure about the sustainability of 
low inflation rates in the country. 
4.  Empirical Studies on Turkish Inflation and Disinflation 
5 
4.1 Empirical Evidence on Dynamics of Inflation Prior to 1980 
Turkey experienced a short period of high inflation in the second half of the 1950s but the 
history of today’s high and persistent inflation goes back to the first half of the 1970s at the 
earliest (see also Figure 1 above). The acceleration of inflation after 1953 is explained by the 
fact that the money supply started to grow faster than real output (Fry, 1980) while the decade 
of the 1970s is characterized by both the frequent devaluations of the Turkish lira, and the 
stagflationary effects of two major oil price shocks in 1973–74 and 1978–79. 
__________________________________ 
5  A broad list of studies on causes and effects of both inflation and disinflation in Turkey is available on the 
web at: http://politics.ankara.edu.tr/~kibritci/inflation/turkinf.html.   
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To my knowledge, Akyüz (1973) is the first analytical attempt to study the causes and 
dynamics of inflation in Turkey. For the 1950–68 period, he investigates the relations 
between the money supply and prices in terms of a combined “adaptive expectations - 
demand for money” model, and concludes that inflation is not self-generating, and it can be 
explained by the present and past changes in the money supply, real income, and the non-
monetization ratio. His further analysis shows that the monetary growth in Turkey is largely 
attributable to the expansion in the monetary base, which in turn is closely related to the 
agricultural price policies followed by the government through the State Economic 
Enterprises in the mid 1950s. He stresses that the political reason for these economic policies 
was the populist tendency of the first elected government after the transition to a multi-party 
parliamentary system in 1950. 
Ertuğrul’s (1982) comprehensive study departs from the statistical analysis of causality 
between money and prices prior to 1980. The author develops then step-by-step a self-
generating inflation model with six equations which is based on the statistical endogenity of 
money supply and on the assumption of adaptive inflation expectations in Turkey. Notice that 
he models government deficits as a function of relative agricultural support prices. Ertuğrul’s 
macroeconometric simultaneous-system estimations based on deseasonalized quarterly data 
for 1970–78 show that increases in real income have a remarkable negative effect on the 
general price level. He concludes that inflationary expectations variable is the major 
determinant of inflation in Turkey. 
Aksoy (1982), on the other hand, aims to test the monetarist and structuralist theories of 
inflation by using Turkish annual data for the period of 1950–79. He mainly concludes that 
the relationship between the money supply and prices is not proportional, but depends on both 
the inflationary expectations and the nature of foreign exchange availability. Furthermore, he  
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finds little evidence on the cost-push effects of relative prices, i.e. the relative price shocks 
work through the money supply mechanism rather than creating cost-push pressures. 
In the late 1970s, two major phenomena seem to contribute substantially to the increase in 
inflationary pressure in the financially-repressed Turkish economy: first, the fast domestic 
credit expansion, particularly to government and public sector enterprises, and second, the 
sharp recession caused by the foreign exchange shortage, which in turn stemmed from two 
oil-price shocks. After his analysis using quarterly data for 1962–77, Levy (1981: 370) adds: 
Since the prices of oil and other raw materials are still rising, Turkey’s terms of trade can be expected to 
deteriorate further. In order to ease the adjustment of the economy to the higher world price of petroleum and 
raw materials, their domestic prices must be increased. Although political and social pressures do not make 
this an easy task, Turkey’s inability to pay for its imports and pressure by the International Monetary Fund 
have recently forces the Turkish government to announce an increase in the price of oil and oil products. 
[Italics are added.] 
Finally, using annual data to estimate a simple model for the demand for money, Togan 
(1987) reports that the time path of money and interest rate determined the movements in the 
rate of inflation from 1960 to 1983. 
4.2 Sources of Inflation in the 1980s and 1990s 
There is a much larger literature focusing on specific aspects of post-1979 inflation in Turkey. 
The sharp acceleration of inflation in 1980 and the increased availability of statistical data for 
shorter frequencies after 1980 appear to have contributed to this enrichment in the empirical 
literature. 
For many authors, Öniş and Özmucur (1990) is a common starting point to survey the 
studies on causes of Turkish inflation after 1979. Using monthly data from 1981–87, Öniş and 
Özmucur (1990) explore inflationary dynamics in Turkey. The authors reject a pure monetary 
explanation of inflation based on a vector-autoregression analysis (VAR) and a simultaneous 
equation model. They find that devaluations of the Turkish lira have a strong impact on   
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domestic inflation while supply-side factors seem to have in general significant effects on 
inflation. Rittenberg (1993) argues contrarily that Granger causality tests show that causality 
runs from price level changes to exchange rate changes but that there is not feedback causality 
in the opposite direction. 
Yeldan (1993) analyzes the political economy of inflation and disinflation in Turkey, by 
focusing particularly on distributional and structural aspects. His computable general 
equilibrium analysis with some Keynesian features shows that public sector expenditures act 
as an important and strong source of demand-pull inflation in Turkey. Furthermore, the 
distributional conflicts among socio-economic classes have a direct impact on the formation 
of price movements in the 1980s. He observes that the profit/rent inflation, which is based on 
increases of monopolistic producer mark-ups over prime costs, has a relatively strong 
inflationary impact on the cost-side, as compared to wage inflation. Finally, Yeldan refers to 
devaluationist exchange-rate policy as a major source of imported inflation due to the import-
dependent character of the Turkish industry. İnsel (1995), Erol and van Wijnbergen (1997), 
Lim and Papi (1997), Agénor and Hoffmaister (1997), Darrat (1997) and Akyürek (1999) also 
provide results supporting the inflationary effects of depreciations. For many authors, this 
conclusion implicates the necessity to design an exchange-rate-based stabilization program to 
reduce the inflation in Turkey. 
In 1984, domestic citizens were allowed to open foreign exchange deposit (FED) accounts 
in Turkish banks. The subsequent increase in FED-accounts to money-supply ratio after 1984 
may be interpreted as a gross indication of rising currency substitution in Turkey (see Table 
1). The capital account liberalization in 1989 also seems to have contributed to this 
development. In the presence of strong currency substitution, it is theoretically expected that 
the exchange rate instability significantly increases and that the government’s ability to 
collect seigniorage revenue is limited. Currency substitution, which may create inflationary  
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effects by reducing the seigniorage revenue of the government, is closely related to the 
credibility of economic policies or inflation expectations. If, for example, economic agents 
perceive that the government will pursue a lax fiscal policy, then they flee from domestic 
currency to avoid future inflation tax. In this case, both the money demand and the exchange 
rate become unstable. The effects of currency substitution on exchange rate instability and 
seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation in Turkey are empirically investigated by Selçuk 
(1994, 1997 and 2002), Scacciavillani (1995) and Akçay, Alper and Karasulu (1997). 
Scacciavillani (1995) mainly reports that the share of foreign currency holdings in liquid 
assets exhibits a strong and stable relationship with exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, 
he finds that the relationship between the inflation rate and currency substitution is 
statistically insignificant. Selçuk (2002), on the other hand, concludes that, as long as there is 
some degree of currency substitution in the economy, the Turkish government cannot collect 
more seigniorage revenue to finance budget deficits by simply setting the growth rate of 
monetary base at a higher level. 
In recent years, the impact of exchange-rate changes on prices is usually investigated by 
economists within the framework of the so-called exchange-rate-pass-through literature that 
concentrates on measuring the transmission degree of a change in nominal exchange rates to 
domestic wholesale and/or consumer price indices. Using a recursive VAR model for Turkey, 
for example, Leigh and Rossi (2002) founded that (i) the impact of the exchange rate on 
prices is over after about a year, but is mostly felt in the first four months, (ii) the pass-
through to wholesale prices is more pronounced compared to the pass-through to consumer 
prices, and (iii) the estimated pass-through is complete in a shorter time and is larger than 
estimated for other key emerging market economies. Furthermore, Selçuk (2004) reports that 
the exchange-rate-pass-through in Turkey is around 35 to 50 percent. Consequently, a   
18 
slowdown in nominal exchange-rate depreciation would result in a smaller inflation. 
Similarly, nominal appreciation would have some deflationary effect on prices. 
Metin (1995) concludes by using a broader data set with annual and quarterly frequencies 
that fiscal expansion dominated the determination of Turkish inflation from 1950 to 1988. 
Excess money demand influences inflation positively in the short run. That is, to reduce 
inflation successfully, governments have to eliminate public sector budget deficits. 
Furthermore, devaluations also have some inflationary effects. 
Akçay, Alper, and Özmucur (2002) investigate the relationship between inflation and the 
budget deficit and debt sustainability. After testing for stationarity in the discounted debt to 
GNP ratio from 1970 to 2000, they conclude that the fiscal outlook does not appear to be 
sustainable. While noting that lack of sustainability does not imply insolvency, this finding 
nonetheless suggests the importance of a change towards fiscal austerity to avoid insolvency 
in the future. They also find that increases in the public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) 
lead to higher inflation and that the PSBR is a better indicator of Turkey’s fiscal position than 
is the consolidated budget deficit. They suggest that previous studies that have focused on the 
more transparent budget deficit may have drawn erroneous conclusions between Turkey’s 
fiscal policies and inflation. By using 1989–2002 data, Pongsaparn’s (2002) findings suggest 
significant role played by both monetary and fiscal factors in determining inflation. Debt is 
the root to inflation and banking sector failure and can be relieved in many ways such as fiscal 
discipline, improvement in tax collection or privatization. 
In Turkey, it is common for politicians and bureaucrats to blame crude-oil price increases 
for inflation. Özatay (1992), Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu (1999), and a few studies cited in 
Kibritçioğlu (2001) discuss the potential once-and-for-all price effects of increases in crude-
oil and oil-product prices. By using the 1990 input-output table for Turkey, Kibritçioğlu and 
Kibritçioğlu (1999) calculate that a hypothetical 20% increase in the dollar price of imported  
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crude-oil leads to a cumulative increase in the general price level of only 1.1% within ten 
months. Furthermore, they estimate that a 20% increase in the nominal dollar price of the 
Turkish lira contributes to inflation in the amount of 2.8% within the same time frame. 
Finally, their VAR model estimations indicate the importance of both nominal exchange rate 
increases and past values of inflation itself as main determinants of inflation for the period 
1986–98. The results of the study by Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu (1999) regarding the 
inflationary effects of oil-price increases are broadly supported in a recent study by Dibooğlu 
and Kibritçioğlu (2004). 
The negligible role of a crude-oil price increase as a determinant of Turkish inflation may 
be explained principally by both the absence of a dynamic mechanism which generates 
continuous increases in the price level, and the gradually decreasing oil-dependency of many 
industries after 1980 as in the rest of the world. But, the substantial swings in the crude-oil 
prices since the late 1980s are usually followed by fiscal-conditional increases in prices of oil-
products in Turkey. Obviously, this phenomenon makes the analysis of net inflationary effects 
of crude-oil price increases more complicated. 
Recently, Uygur (1992), Akçay, Alper and Özmucur (1997), Lim and Papi (1997), Agénor 
and Hoffmaister (1997), Alper and Üçer (1998), Akyürek (1999), Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and 
Yeldan (1999), Baum et al. (1999) and Şahinbeyoğlu (2001) have emphasized in particular 
the increasing role of inertia in the process of inflation in Turkey. Erlat (2002), for instance, 
states that both Turkish consumer and wholesale price indexes each have a significant long-
run memory component. The expectational component of inflation inertia may result from the 
lack of credibility of government policies. He reasons that a disinflation program will 
eventually achieve its aim but that there will initially be a great deal of resistance on the 
inflation front.   
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4.3 Studies on Disinflation in Turkey 
The empirical literature on dynamics and possible effects of disinflation in Turkey is 
relatively poor but the recent tendency towards disinflation may encourage more economists 
to work on this issue in the future. 
The Turkish banking sector experienced many borderline or systemic crises in the 1980s 
and 1990s, as pinpointed by Kibritçioğlu (2003) using a so-called banking sector fragility 
index. The large share of the banking sector within the financial system as in many 
developing economies, as well as the strong dynamic interactions between banking crises, 
currency crises, recessions and inflation in the past, indicate that the possible role of the 
banking sector in inflationary and disinflationary processes needs to be investigated in detail. 
Alper, Berument and Malatyalı (2002), for example, examine whether the structure of the 
financial system is compatible with a more stable, lower inflation environment. Based on 
descriptive and regression analyses of the Turkish banking sector, they conclude that a 
successful disinflation program, including continued privatization or “autonomization” of 
public banks, will result in bank consolidation and a growth in the size of foreign banks 
(either through opening new branches or through mergers and acquisitions). They predict that 
as outstanding government debt stock falls and banks compete with each other for asset 
management, economies of scale will become important and small banks will disappear. 
Efficiency should also increase in this sector and the installation of fee-based services will 
become more common. Because in this new environment, management of credit risk, as 
opposed to sovereign risk, will grow in importance and banks will return to core banking 
activities, the development of secondary securities markets will be critical in shoring up 
Turkey’s fragile banking system. Further progress on bank restructuring is critical, the authors 
argue, to the success of the disinflation program implemented in 2002.  
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Kirmanoğlu (2001) suggests that Turkey has faced the cost of high inflation in terms of 
lower economic growth. His results show that inflation adversely affects both private 
investments and the economic growth in Turkey. Using a GARCH-M system of equations and 
analyzing a nearly 40-year period (1963–2000), Nas and Perry (2002) find a direct 
relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty and an inverse relationship between 
inflation uncertainty and real GDP growth. Thus a benefit of disinflation in Turkey should be 
higher real growth. 
Recently, by using a dynamic open-economy aggregate supply – aggregate demand model 
with imperfect capital mobility and structural vector-autoregressions, Dibooğlu and 
Kibritçioğlu (2004) showed that a major component of inflation in Turkey between 1980 and 
2002 has been “aggregate demand-driven” or “core” inflation. Real oil-price, supply and 
balance-of-payments shocks had no significant effect on inflation while the real aggregate-
demand shocks, which stemmed from changes in the money stock and autonomous aggregate-
demand, can be interpreted as a combined result of changes in high public sector budget 
deficits and devaluations of the Turkish lira. Finally, they also founded that output is mainly 
explained by supply shocks within the model. 
When inflation runs high for a sustained period of time, inflationary expectations and 
inflation inertia play a significant role in inflation dynamics. Recently Dibooğlu (2002) 
showed that inflationary expectations have forward- and backward-looking elements in 
Turkey. A key result of the study is that forward-looking expectations dominate; as such the 
output costs of a credible disinflation program are likely to be limited. Indeed the limited 
effects of aggregate demand shocks on output in this paper also provide evidence that a 
credible disinflation program may not have significant output costs.
6 The lack of political 
__________________________________ 
6 Celasun  et al. (2003) recently investigated the empirical validity of the argument that inflation in Turkey has 
become “inertial”, posing an obstacle to disinflation. Their results show that the current degree of inflation   
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determination to undertake timely structural reforms fed inflationary expectations. It can be 
said that Turkish macroeconomic policies in the 1980s and 1990s reflected a preference 
toward expansionary policies at the expense of price stability. When governments in Turkey 
faced a choice between responding to the immediate needs of their constituents and reforms 
necessary for sustainable long-run growth, they opted for the first, and quite predictably, 
Turkey became one of few countries in history to have a high sustained inflation short of 
hyperinflation for more than two decades. 
The result, achieved by Dibooğlu and Kibritçioğlu (2004), that a major component of 
inflation is demand-driven core-inflation highlights the importance of structural reforms and 
credible commitment mechanisms that restrain discretionary aggregate demand polices. To 
the extent that recent program maintains the current high credibility of the government and is 
accompanied by necessary structural reforms, it really can bring the high inflation era to an 
end, and stabilize the economy. 
Notice that, for Turkey, as a country that has a long history of high inflation and a high 
degree of foreign-currency-denominated external debt, both the stability of the exchange rate 
and its volatility are crucial. The results by Selçuk and Ardıç (2004a and 2004b) indicate that 
the Turkish Central Bank’s recent interventionist foreign-exchange-market policies, 
accompanied with favorable external factors, such as the recent falling spread between 
emerging market bonds and US treasury bills, were indeed effective in taming the volatility of 
the exchange rate in a relatively short period of time in the aftermath of the February 2001 
crisis. However, the strong real appreciation of the Turkish lira, as it was the case in 2003,
7 
implies that an increase in the current account deficit, along both with a possible slowdown in 
                                                                                                                                                          
persistence in Turkey is lower than in Brazil and Uruguay prior to their successful stabilization programs. 
Furthermore, forward-looking expectations are more important than backward-looking expectations in 
shaping the inflation process. Their results are broadly in line with findings by Dibooğlu (2002). 
7  For a broad discussion on measurement issues regarding the degree of real-exchange-rate misalignment in 
Turkey, see Kibritçioğlu and Kibritçioğlu (2004).  
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manufacturing productivity and with an unexpected adverse shock in the spread, may cause a 
sharp increase in nominal exchange rates and hence, result in an increased risk premium of 
the country, further worsening the fiscal position of the government. Thus, in order to 
maintain the success in macroeconomic stabilization, the current government also should take 
into account this type of “accumulated risks” in the economy. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
This study departs from a four-blocked schematization of origins of inflation: Demand-side 
(or monetary) shocks, supply-side (or real) shocks, adjustment (or inertial) factors, and 
political processes (or the role of institutions). Accordingly, inflation is the net result of 
sophisticated dynamic interactions of these four groups of explanatory factors. In other words, 
inflation is always and everywhere a macroeconomic and institutional phenomenon. 
The survey of the empirical studies in Section 4 on the dynamics of high and persistent 
inflation in Turkey shows that the existing modeling experiences seem to have focused 
mainly on demand-side factors, such as the money supply and government deficits. Some 
studies are limited solely to investigate the possible effects of one-time shocks, such as 
occasional increases in oil prices. However, the persistent nature of high inflation requires a 
more integrated framework to explore the dynamics of inflationary mechanism in Turkey. 
Therefore, the possible sources and the degree of inflation inertia need to be investigated 
further. The consideration of inertia in existing empirical studies is generally limited to the 
role of inflationary expectations. However, the study of the short-run adjustment dynamics of 
the general price level should also be examined further as attempted recently by Çağlayan and 
Filiztekin (2001). 
The role of the political process in explaining Turkish inflation has been in general ignored 
in empirical modeling efforts. To my knowledge, there are some political-economy   
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approaches to explain Turkish inflation (e.g., Öniş, 1997 and Özatay, 1999), but empirical 
studies in the tradition of new political economy are far from adequate. Recently, Ergun 
(2000) and Tutar and Tansel (2001) focus particularly on institutional and electoral 
determinants of government budget deficits in the country, while Akat (2000) identifies four 
categories of social actors as being responsible for the persistence of inflation in Turkey: the 
politicians, the voters, the bureaucratic establishment in Ankara, and the Turkish business 
community. Apparently, it is crucial to consider institutional explanatory factors in 
understanding the dynamics of inflation and disinflation in Turkey. 
The prolonged history of high inflation and the recent disinflation tendency in Turkey offer 
to economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians a good opportunity to 
investigate their causes and effects both empirically and in an interdisciplinary fashion. 
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